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BARBIE’S LIFE IN PLASTIC: IT’S FANTASTIC
FOR FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION—OR IS
IT? MATTEL, INC. V. MCA RECORDS, INC., 296 F.3D
894 (9TH CIR. 2002)
Bryan M. Gallo*

I. INTRODUCTION
Trademarks1 are the lifeblood of the modern commercial marketplace.
They can be found in countless places, from highway billboards to the
nearest pop-up internet ad, and are fiercely guarded by their owners. The
sole purpose of a trademark is to serve an “identifying role.”2 But what
happens when a mark, rooted in the reputation and history of a company’s
rise to success, begins to transcend its traditional “identifying role” and
becomes a “cultural icon?” Such is the fate of Barbie.
For those who are seeking to use socially popular trademarks in an
artistic setting, such as books, movies, and songs, the recent decision in
Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc. helped to clarify and expand upon what
constitutes permissible fair use.3 Unfortunately, for those seeking to guard
their marks, this decision has provided no clear guidance as to the strength
of the owner’s future rights.4
One of the core issues in Mattel is whether traditional trademark
infringement analysis,5 or the newer Second Circuit test, is applicable when
* Staff Writer, 2003-04, University of Dayton Law Review; J.D. expected May 2005, University of
Dayton School of Law; B.S. in Mechanical Engineering, 2001, Ohio University. The author wishes to
thank his wife for her support, and Professor Jeffrey Matsuura for his insight in the development of this
note.
1
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1129 (2000). A trademark is a word, phrase, or symbol that is used to identify a
manufacturer or sponsor of a good or the provider of a service. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296
F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002). Trademarks inform consumers that trademarked goods come from the
same source in an attempt to prevent others from duping consumers into buying similar products. Id.
2
New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publg., Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 305 (9th Cir. 1992). That is, a
trademark merely identifies the manufacturer or sponsor of a good or the provider of a service. Id.
3
Fair use is a defense in a trademark action that forbids a trademark holder from claiming exclusive
use over a descriptive term so as to prevent others from accurately describing a characteristic of their
goods. Id. at 306. For example, although the name of the band, New Kids on the Block, is a registered
trademark, a newspaper was permitted to print the name of the band alongside a poll asking its readers,
“Who’s the best on the block?” Id. at 304.
4
In holding that Aqua’s use of the word “Barbie” in the title of its song “Barbie Girl” was
permissible, the court in Mattel failed to establish any boundaries regarding when a potential future use
of the word “Barbie” in another artistic work would be impermissible. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 902.
5
Traditional trademark analysis relies solely on a balancing of factors in an attempt to determine
whether there is a likelihood of consumer confusion between two competing trademarks. Parks v.
Laface Records, 329 F.3d 437, 448 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341,
348 (9th Cir. 1979)). Under this approach, a defense asserted under the First Amendment is given no
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a trademark has evolved into a cultural icon.6 In Mattel, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals was confronted with reconciling a trademark infringement
action between two vastly different products: Barbie dolls and pop music.
Rather than applying the traditional trademark analysis, the court adopted a
test from the Second Circuit, holding that where a trademark has taken on
an expressive meaning in society apart from its source-identifying function,
especially in the context of an artistic parody of a pop icon, the Lanham
Act7 should only apply to artistic works using that trademark where the
public interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the public
interest in free expression.8
This Note will argue that, although the Mattel court correctly applied
the Second Circuit test9 with respect to the specific facts of the Barbie Girl
song, its failure to provide detailed guidance on what factual circumstances
trigger this test in place of traditional trademark analysis may have
unknowingly opened a Pandora’s Box of potential trademark issues.10
Section II outlines the background of this case. Section III explores more
fully the analysis used in Mattel and concludes that the court was correct in
foregoing traditional trademark analysis in favor of the Second Circuit test
under the specific facts of this case. However, the court’s application of the
Second Circuit’s test appears to promote a limited right to the public use of
a “cultural icon” trademark without ever defining the boundaries of such a
right. Finally, the court may have failed to consider fully the damage that its
application of the Second Circuit’s standard may have on future trademark
infringement claims against the Barbie mark.

special attention. Id.
6

296 F.3d at 900.

7

15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1129. The Lanham Act provides the basis for federal protection of trademarks,
incorporating common-law trademark doctrine and enhancing it by providing a system for registering
marks with the federal government. Parks, 329 F.3d at 445. Registration provides a number of benefits,
such as protection throughout the geographic United States and a legal presumption of trademark
validity. Id.
8

Mattel, 296 F.3d at 902.

9

The Second Circuit test only permits application of the Lanham Act to artistic works “where the
public interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the public interest in free expression.” Id. at
901.
10

See supra n. 5.
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II. BACKGROUND

A. The Facts of Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc.
Barbie was created in 1957, inspired by a German doll named Lilli,
who was “a pornographic caricature that was a lascivious plaything for
men.”11 Mattel reformed the doll over time to represent purity and
innocence, and turned it into a huge commercial success that clears over $2
billion in annual profits from sales in 140 countries.12 Since its inception,
women have critiqued what Barbie, as a product and a social icon, says
about how women should be.13 “Barbie has been celebrated as the
prototypical woman and simultaneously blamed for creating unrealistic
expectations of women.”14 She has been satirized by artist Paul Hansen
through modified dolls named “Hooker Barbie,” “Carrie Barbie,” and “Big
Dyke Barbie,”15 while at the same time still being pervasive and popular
enough in her natural state that somewhere in the world, Mattel sells two
Barbie dolls every second.16
In 1997, Danish pop group Aqua released the song Barbie Girl on the
album Aquarium.17 In the song, one band member impersonates Barbie by
singing in a high-pitched, doll-like voice about being “a Barbie girl, in [her]
Barbie world.”18 She sings to Ken (Barbie’s male counterpart), telling him
“Life in plastic, it’s fantastic. You can brush my hair, undress me
everywhere / Imagination, life is your creation.”19 Similarly, one band

11
Steven M. Cordero, Student Author, Cocaine-Cola, the Velvet Elvis, and Anti-Barbie: Defending
Trademark and Publicity Rights to Cultural Icons, 8 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 599, 636
(1998).
12
Id. It is worth noting that Mattel’s efforts to reform the original Lilli doll into one that represents
purity and innocence is only material to the trademark infringement claim insofar as it provides the
baseline public perception of the Barbie doll from which to establish that Aqua’s “Barbie Girl” song
represented a parody of it.
13

Alyson Lewis, Student Author, Playing Around with Barbie TM: Expanding Fair Use for
Cultural Icons, 1 J. Intell. Prop. 61, 72 (1999).
14
Tamar Buchakjian, Student Author, Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc.: Let’s Party in Barbie’s
World – Expanding the First Amendment Right to Musical Parody of Cultural Icons, 36 Loy. L.A. L.
Rev. 1321, 1323 (2003).
15

Cordero, supra n. 11, at 638.

16

Lewis, supra n. 13, at 73.

17

Mattel, 296 F.3d at 899. The Aquarium album contained eleven tracks, including parodies of
many other icons, including popular movies such as Indiana Jones and The Candyman.
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member impersonates Ken, who tries to entice Barbie to “go party.”20
Barbie Girl rose quickly in the music world, and, much to the chagrin of
Mattel, the stinging parody eventually made its way to the Top 40 music
charts, taking Aqua along with it.21
Mattel filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central
District of California against MCA Records, Inc., the primary music
company that produced, marketed, and sold the Barbie Girl song in the
United States, along with a handful of other domestic and foreign music
companies affiliated with MCA (collectively “MCA”) by cross-licensing
agreements to distribute Barbie Girl worldwide.22
In its original complaint, Mattel alleged eleven causes of action,23
including trademark infringement and trademark dilution.24 On appeal,
Mattel challenged the district court’s ruling that the Barbie Girl song was a
parody of Barbie and a nominative fair use and that MCA’s use of the term
Barbie is not likely to confuse consumers as to Mattel’s affiliation with the
song.25
B. The Lower Court Opinion
Mattel initially petitioned the court for a preliminary injunction on its
claims for trademark infringement in early 1998 to enjoin MCA from

20

Id. at 899.

21

Id.

22

Id.

23

The eleven claims included: (1) trademark and trade dress dilution (under state and federal law);
(2) trademark infringement; (3) false designation of origin and false description; (4) statutory and
common law unfair competition; (5) unfair competition under the Paris Convention; (6) wrongful use of
a registered mark; (7) common law misappropriation; (8) common law passing-off and disparagement;
(9) common law unjust enrichment; (10) contributory trademark and trade dress dilution (under state and
federal law); and (11) contributory trademark and trade dress infringement. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA
Records, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1126 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
24
Id. Trademark infringement is codified in section 43(a) of the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a))
and creates a civil cause of action against any person who identifies his or her product in such a way as
to create confusion among consumers as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of a product by another
person. Parks, 329 F.3d at 445. The language of section 43(a) is broad, and plaintiffs often invoke this
section to protect trademarks of ordinary merchandise, as well as celebrity names and titles of artistic
works. Id. Trademark dilution, codified in the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (15 U.S.C. § 1125),
provides a private cause of action against anyone whose use of a trademark “[whittles] away at its
value” or tarnishes the trademark with negative associations. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 903. Contrary to
trademark infringement, the injury from dilution usually occurs when consumers are not confused about
the source of the product, but rather seeks to prevent a third party from appropriating the substantial
investment that the trademark owner has put into its mark. Id.
25
Id. at 899. For a discussion on parody as it relates to trademark infringement claims see infra notes
70-74 and accompanying text.
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manufacturing, producing, and distributing Barbie Girl, and to require the
destruction of any product or packaging using Mattel’s Barbie trademark.26
The court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction, claiming that
Mattel failed to show that it was likely to succeed on its infringement
claim.27
After the denial of the preliminary injunction, MCA filed a motion for
summary judgment to dismiss the case.28 The district court granted the
motion for summary judgment in favor of MCA.29 At the outset, the court
addressed the question of whether Barbie Girl constituted a parody,30
noting that a parody has socially significant value as free speech under the
First Amendment.31 After examining Aqua’s lyrics and music video, the
court determined that the singers were poking fun at Barbie by spoofing the
unrealness of Barbie and parodying a woman who is like Barbie, as “one
who is plastic, unreal, and easily manipulable by others.”32 The court
recognized that the album identifies on the CD case that the song “is a
social comment and was not created or approved by the makers of the
doll.”33 The court found the song Barbie Girl to be a parody and noted that,
based on the song’s fast tempo and the exaggerated performances of the
singers, “the lyrics are not to be taken too seriously.”34
Next, the court decided that Barbie Girl did not infringe on the Barbie
trademark because the reference to Mattel’s doll fell within the fair use of
the term “Barbie.”35 To justify its position, the court applied not only the
traditional trademark analysis, but also another test called the “New Kids”
26

Mattel, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1126. Ironically, Mattel did not sue Aqua directly, claiming that it
was not attempting to “censor” the song. Id. Instead, Mattel requested that the court require MCA
Records to “dispose or destroy any product or its packaging, which uses Mattel’s Barbie trade name.”
Id.
27

Id.

28

Id.

29

Id. at 1156.

30

Id. at 1136. Parodies have socially significant value as free speech under the First Amendment
because they play an important role in social and literary criticisms, even though they may discourage or
discredit the original author. Id. As such, “a parodist whose expressive work aims its parodic
commentary at a trademark is given considerable leeway, but a claimed parodic use that makes no
comment on the mark is not a permitted trademark parody use.” Mattel, 296 F.3d at 901.
31
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution reads “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. Const. amend. I.
32

Mattel, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1138.

33

Id. at 1142.

34

Id. at 1138.

35

Id. at 1141. “Fair use” is a defense that, in essence, forbids a trademark owner registrant from
appropriating a descriptive term for his exclusive use so as to prevent others from accurately describing
a characteristic of their goods. New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 306.
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standard.36 The New Kids standard permits a nominative fair use defense by
a user who does not attempt to capitalize on consumer confusion and whose
use of a mark is required because it is “the only word reasonably available
to describe a particular thing.”37 The crux of this fair use test is whether the
defendants attempted to capitalize on consumer confusion.38 The court
found sufficient evidence that MCA had taken steps to avoid consumer
confusion and determined that MCA’s use of the Barbie mark was not an
infringement.39
Alternatively, the court also applied the traditional trademark analysis
standard to dismiss Mattel’s claims of trademark infringement.40 This
standard is comprised of eight factors:
(1) the strength of the mark; (2) proximity of the goods; (3)
similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5)
marketing channels used; (6) type of goods and the degree of care
likely to be exercised by the purchaser; (7) defendant’s intent in
selecting the mark; and (8) likelihood of expansion of the product
lines.41
It is designed to determine whether confusion between related goods is
likely.42 Applying the eight factors to the facts at hand, along with an
additional factor that considered the First Amendment values at issue, the
court determined that Mattel’s products (children’s dolls) were unrelated to
MCA’s Barbie Girl song as a matter of law.43
C. Holding of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the court framed the issue somewhat
differently than the lower court, approaching it from the position that
“[w]ith fame comes unwanted attention.”44 It sought to decide the question
of how far trademark rights can extend before encroaching “upon the zone
36
Mattel, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1143. The “New Kids” standard provides a defense to a claim for
trademark infringement based on the “nominative use” of a mark. That is, a trademark infringement
claim will not lie “where the only word reasonably available to describe a particular thing is pressed into
service.” New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308.
37

Mattel, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1141.

38

Id.

39

Id. at 1143.

40

Id. at 1144.

41

Id.

42

Id.

43

Id. at 1147.

44

Mattel, 296 F.3d at 899.
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of the First Amendment” when those same trademarks begin to “fill gaps in
our vocabulary and add a contemporary flavor to our expressions.”45
In affirming the decision of the district court, the court stressed that
Barbie is not simply a toy.46 Rather, she has become an American cultural
icon, and as such a “trademark owner does not have the right to control
public discourse whenever the public imbues his mark with a meaning
beyond its source-identifying function.”47
Dismissing the traditional trademark analysis, the court found that
when a mark attains an “expressive meaning apart from its sourceidentifying function,” the application of the traditional test “fails to account
for the full weight of the public’s interest in free expression.”48 To better
account for First Amendment considerations, the court abandoned both the
“New Kids” and the traditional trademark tests, and instead adopted a
different standard laid out by the Second Circuit in Rogers v. Grimaldi.49 In
Rogers, the Second Circuit held that “in general the [Lanham] Act should
be construed to apply to artistic works only where the public interest in
avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the public interest in free
expression.”50
The Second Circuit further distinguished between the title of artistic
works and ordinary commercial products, observing that consumers expect
a title to describe the underlying work and not to identify its origin.51 It
concluded that literary titles do not violate the Lanham Act “unless the title
has no artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has
some artistic relevance, unless the title explicitly misleads as to the source
or the content of the work.”52
Applying Rogers, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Aqua’s use of
“Barbie” was not an infringement of Mattel’s trademark.53 The court found
that the use of “Barbie” in the song title was clearly artistically relevant
45

Id. at 900.

46

Id.

47

Id. (citing Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Group, 611 F.2d 296, 301 (9th Cir. 1979)
(holding that “[i]t is the source-denoting function which trademark laws protect, and nothing more”)).
48
Id. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text for a listing of the eight factors of traditional
trademark analysis. It is important to notice that traditional trademark analysis does not resolve this issue
because any consideration of the public’s freedom of expression under the First Amendment is entirely
absent.
49

Mattel, 296 F.3d at 902 (citing to Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989)). For
discussion on the “New Kids” test, see supra note 36. For discussion on the traditional trademark test,
see supra note 41 and accompanying text.
50
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Id.

52

Id.

53

Mattel, 296 F.3d at 902.
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because the song is about Barbie and the values Aqua claims she
represents.54 Further, the court found that the song title does not explicitly
mislead as to the source of the work or otherwise suggest that Mattel
produced it.55 Indeed, the opinion concluded by stating that if a staunch
prohibition against the mere use of Barbie in the title were enough to satisfy
the Rogers test, it would render Rogers null and useless.56 Thus, the court
determined that Aqua’s use of the word Barbie in the name of its song
Barbie Girl did not infringe on Mattel’s trademark.57
III. ANALYSIS
This note will argue that the Mattel court correctly concluded that an
artistic parody of a cultural icon deserves an increased level of protection
under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Application of the
Second Circuit test to trademarks that have permeated common language
provides the best balance between the public’s interest in avoiding
consumer confusion with its interest in free expression.58 The inquiry does
not end here. The court must then consider whether the facts of the
underlying case truly deserve application of the Second Circuit test. The
court cannot blindly set forth a policy that the public deserves some limited
right to critique a popular icon without addressing the extent to which this
public right extends. Finally, the court must weigh the possible damage that
application of this test may have in general on future trademark
infringement actions as against the same mark.
A. The Second Circuit Approach is Appropriate for Cultural Icons
Mattel’s claims of trademark infringement were successfully resolved
without use of traditional trademark analysis, thereby affording adequate
weight to Aqua’s freedom of expression protected by the First
Amendment.59 The Mattel court correctly found this method to be the best
balance between the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion and the
public’s interest in freedom of expression when an artistic parody pokes fun
at a cultural icon.

54

Id.

55

Id.

56

Id.

57

Id.

58

Parks, 329 F.3d at 450.

59

Mattel, 296 F.3d at 902.
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The Second Circuit in Rogers was the first to recognize that songs, like
movies, books and plays, deserve protection as unquestionable works of
artistic expression.60 The court also recognized that these works are also
sold in the commercial marketplace and thus deserve some amount of
government regulation, noting that “[t]he purchaser of a book, like the
purchaser of a can of peas, has a right not to be misled as to the source of
the product.”61 Titles of artistic works, though, are a complex combination
of both artistic and commercial elements.62 As such, titles deserve more
protection than ordinary commercial products because they encompass the
additional element of the author’s freedom of expression.63
The Lanham Act, and the trademark protection it offers, deals solely
with the source-identifying function of a “mark.”64 The title of an artistic
work, however, serves to describe the subject matter of the work and rarely
offers any insight as to the source of the work.65 As such, application of the
Lanham Act to the titles of artistic works serves an overbearing purpose in
light of the slight consumer interest in gleaning the source of the work
through the title.66 These considerations led to the Second Circuit test,
wherein “a title with at least some artistic relevance to the work is not
explicitly misleading as to the content of the work” will not draw
application of the Lanham Act.67
Likewise, the concept of an artistic parody has always been particularly
problematic in the context of trademark infringement.68 A large portion of
social dialogue would be practically impossible if its speakers were
threatened by an infringement lawsuit every time they made reference to a
person, product, or company by using its trademarks.69 A parody must
convey, at the same time, two contradictory messages: “that [the parody] is
the original, but also that it is not the original and is instead a parody.”70

60

875 F.2d at 997; see e.g. Parks, 329 F.3d at 450.

61

Rogers, 875 F.2d at 997.

62

Id. at 998.

63

Id. The Sixth Circuit has recently echoed this proposition, stating that traditional “likelihood of
confusion” trademark analysis “ignores the fact that the artistic work is not simply a commercial product
but is also a means of communication.” Parks, 329 F.3d at 449 (emphasis in original).
64

Mattel, 296 F.3d at 901.

65

Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1000.

66

Id.

67

Id. It is important to note that, as presented Rogers, the analysis of a title that allegedly infringes a
registered trademark is judged in the context of the underlying content of the work. Id. Thus, the Ninth
Circuit judged the use of the word “Barbie” in the song title in the context of what the values that Aqua
claims Barbie to represent. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 902.
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New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 307.
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Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 494 (emphasis in original).
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The very targeting for ridicule of an original work justifies a parody’s need
to mimic the original.71 The key to a parody is that it “must be able to
‘conjure up’ at least enough of [the] original to make the object of its
critical wit recognizable.”72 This, in turn, makes the question of an
explicitly misleading title especially troublesome because the very purpose
of parody is imitation.73 As such, the overall balancing and emphasis on
First Amendment values of the Second Circuit approach makes it
particularly suitable in deciding claims of trademark infringement as against
parodies.74
It is important to discern what fact patterns may trigger a court to adopt
this type of First Amendment analysis in lieu of traditional trademark
analysis. This is an important distinction because while the Second Circuit
approach carries the heavy burden of constitutional First Amendment
scrutiny, a prospective plaintiff need only prove that the title has no artistic
relevance to the underlying work, or alternatively that the title explicitly
misleads as to the source of the work.75 On the other hand, the traditional
factors approach requires a prospective plaintiff to spend a considerable
effort litigating at least eight separate factors to convince the court that a
likelihood of consumer confusion exists.76
For example, a quick sampling of cases that chose to apply the Second
Circuit approach reveals that they all involved a powerful cultural icon
against one claiming freedom of artistic expression. Most recently, the
Sixth Circuit chose to apply this test to a battle over the title of a rap song
by the group OutKast entitled Rosa Parks.77 In reversing summary
judgment for the plaintiff and remanding the case, the Sixth Circuit noted
that “Rosa Parks is a well-known public figure who has been recognized as
an international symbol of freedom, humanity, dignity and strength.”78
71

Elvis Presley Enter., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 199 (5th Cir. 1998).

72

Id.

73

Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 494.

74

For example, in Cliffs Notes, the court applied the Second Circuit test to find that the defendant’s
publication of Spy Notes, a spoof on the popular Cliffs Notes summaries of traditional “great books”
that mimicked the style and colors of the front cover of Cliffs Notes, was protected as a parody and
therefore outside the reach of the Lanham Act. Id.
75

Parks, 329 F.3d at 447.

76

Id.

77

Id. at 450. Rosa Parks is a historical figure who became a symbol of the civil rights movement in
the United States during the 1950’s and 1960’s. She is best known for an incident in 1955 where, while
riding in the front of a segregated bus in Montgomery, Alabama, she refused to give up her seat to a
white passenger and move to the back of the bus as was required by the then-existing segregation laws.
Her single act of defiance sparked organized boycotts and demonstrations across the South that brought
civil and human rights causes to the forefront of American politics. Id. at 442.
78
Id. at 453 (reversing the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Parks and remanding the
case for a factual determination of whether the title “Rosa Parks” has any artistic relevance to the
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Other examples of application include Cliffs Notes v. Bantam
Doubleday, a fight involving the publisher of Cliffs Notes, the study guides
well-known to most college students, against a competitor’s parody called
Spy Notes,79 and, of course, Rogers v. Grimaldi, the landmark Second
Circuit case involving the silver screen mega-stars of times past: Ginger
Rogers and Fred Astaire.80
A surprisingly similar case that appeared some fifteen years before the
Rogers decision, and seven years before the debut of what is now
considered the “traditional” trademark factors analysis, involved another
cultural icon, Coca-Cola.81 Indeed, the Eastern District of New York
described Coca-Cola as “one of the three most-recognized trademarks in the
world” and even went so far as to say that “one would have to be a visitor
from another planet” not to immediately recognize the familiar stylized
script and accompanying words, colors, and design of the Coca-Cola
trademark.82 The case involved a commercial printer that distributed and
sold a poster that modified Coca-Cola’s distinctive trademark to read
“Enjoy Cocaine.”83 The court applied a more rudimentary balancing of
factors analysis to determine that a likelihood of consumer confusion
existed and decided the case in favor of Coca-Cola.84
However, had this case appeared on the docket today, or arguably
anytime after the Rogers decision came down, it is possible that the facts of
the case would have triggered the Second Circuit analysis. Again, this case
involved an undisputable cultural icon, and an artist claiming freedom of
expression.85 The poster manufacturer would likely have fared better today
under the Second Circuit analysis because, as First Amendment
considerations are placed at the forefront of the inquiry, he would only be
content of the song by OutKast because only if the title had no artistic relevance to the song would it
constitute a violation of the Lanham Act).
79

Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 497 (reversing the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction
against Bantam’s “Spy Notes” publication because it found Spy Notes to be a parody of the famous
Cliffs Notes, noting that “although it surely conjures up the original and goes to great lengths to use
some of the identical colors and aspects of the cover design of Cliffs Notes, [it] raises only a slight risk
of consumer confusion that is outweighed by the public interest in free expression”).
80

Rogers, 875 F.2d at 996 (granting summary judgment in favor of defendant filmmaker, who used
the title “Ginger and Fred” for a fictional movie about two Italian cabaret performers who imitated
Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire because the risk that the title would mislead some consumers as to what
the work is actually about is outweighed by the danger that suppressing an artistically relevant title
would unjustifiably restrict expression).
81

Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1186 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).

82

Id. at 1187.

83

Id.

84

Id. at 1191.

85

Id. at 1187. The court aptly noted that “one would have to be a visitor from another planet” not to
immediately recognize the familiar stylized script and accompanying words, colors and design of the
Coca-Cola trademark. Id.
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required to prove: (1) artistic relevance between usage of the Coca-Cola
mark and the underlying “spoof” on the soft-drink giant; and (2) that the
poster did not explicitly mislead consumers to believe that Coca-Cola had
decided to capitalize on the drug market.86 While this would be good news
for the poster manufacturers of the world, it would be another example in a
terrible pattern of cases weakening the legal protection afforded to the
owners of trademarks that have become powerful cultural icons.
Aqua’s use of the Barbie mark in the title of the Barbie Girl song is
clearly justified under the Second Circuit approach. Barbie is a steadfast
“symbol of American girlhood.”87 The court goes so far as to suggest that
Barbie is ripe for parody and unrestricted commentary by calling her a
public figure and steadfast symbol of American girlhood, while observing
that unwanted attention necessarily follows fame.88 The song relies solely
on the Barbie mark to poke fun at Barbie herself and the values that she
represents.89 The song’s primary writer, Soren Rasted, stated that he wanted
“to compose a humorous song about the ‘Barbie fantasy world’” and that
the song was really commenting on Barbie’s status in popular culture, “like
the royal family, which is not to be tampered with.”90 Thus, the song title
has a clear artistic relevance to the underlying work (i.e. the song itself).
Further, the title does not explicitly mislead consumers into believing that
Mattel produced the song merely because it includes the word Barbie as one
half of Barbie Girl.91 As noted in Mattel, if the single incantation of Barbie
in the title were enough to satisfy the requirement of explicitly misleading
as to the content, it would render the Second Circuit test a nullity because
such a per se rule of trademark infringement would eliminate any need for
the balancing provided by the test.92 It seems clear that the Second Circuit
test may be properly applied to the facts of the case at hand.

86
It is worth noting that even if the poster manufacturer could win on the trademark infringement
claim, Coca-Cola had also alleged a number of other claims, including trademark dilution and unfair
competition, on which it would likely prevail. Trademark dilution occurs when an infringing mark
“whittles away” at the value of a trademark and tarnishes the mark. Mattel, 296 F.3d at 903.
87

Id. at 899.

88

Id.

89

Id. at 901.
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Mattel, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1138, 1142.
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Id.
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Mattel, 296 F.3d at 902.
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B. The Ninth Circuit’s Failure to Provide a Boundary on the Public’s
Right to Comment on Cultural Icons
Mattel’s loss in the Ninth Circuit served a deadly blow to its ability to
restrict the public from freely commenting on the Barbie trademark in any
given artistic form. Beginning the opinion from the premise that one who
seeks fame must be ready to cope with any unwanted attention that
necessarily follows, the court appeared to be more influenced by ideas of
free expression than the protection of commercial namesakes.93 It paid
particular attention to the notion that a trademark cannot realize the
popularity required to become a cultural icon without the direct
participation of the public, and thus the public should enjoy the ability to
comment on the trademark that it has helped to attain greatness.94
Considering this public right in deciding that Aqua’s use of the Barbie mark
did not infringe Mattel’s trademark, yet never explaining how future courts
are to account for it in a trademark infringement action, the Ninth Circuit
failed to provide adequate boundaries on the public’s right to comment on
cultural icons.
In the consumer-driven world in which we live, the most popular
trademarks often enter the popular vernacular and become an integral part
of society’s language.95 For example, the Ninth Circuit asks “[h]ow else do
you say that something’s ‘the Rolls Royce of its class?’”96 Marks that have
become irretrievably embedded in our language by public use begin to take
on a role apart from their natural source-identifying role, and thus the
trademark holder must give some latitude to the public’s First Amendment
interest in free expression.97 The Ninth Circuit advocates the “public right”
to comment on these popular trademarks by stating that “the trademark
owner does not have the right to control public discourse whenever the
public imbues his mark with a meaning beyond its source-identifying
function.”98 In the final decision, however, the court leaves open the
question as to how much “right” the public actually has to comment on
cultural icons in holding simply that the Barbie mark was not infringed by
its use in the title of a musical parody.99
No trademark can become famous if left isolated, because fame is
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inherently dependent on the public’s participation.100 A trademark owner’s
hard work and effort to achieve notoriety and a positive reputation in the
marketplace is only half of the picture.101 The ascension of a popular mark
to the status of “cultural icon” requires the greatest public effort because
one of the touchstones of an icon is that it means something to virtually
everybody.102 Thus, an argument that the public should not have a right to
comment on a cultural icon must fail under the view that “one should not
get something for nothing.”103
This position is even stronger in the context of a parody, because not
only is the parodist a member of the public that imbued the icon with its
popularity, a parodist then invested additional time and resources to express
its own opinion about the icon to the public.104 Indeed, it has been noted
that “the vibrancy of culture depends upon the existence of a right to draw
ideas from the public domain, and the right to mock cultural icons for both
commercial and entertainment purposes.”105
How much expressive freedom, though, would subject the Barbie
trademark to the plight of genericide? “Genericide” is a term of art used to
describe the process by which a trademark declines from a unique product
identifier to a term that instead refers only to a general class of products.106
Given that the Mattel court appears willing to allow the public to comment
freely about Barbie, it is only reasonable to assume that other artists and
parodists will emerge in the future to weigh-in on their perception of the
Barbie phenomenon.
An attempt to provide guidance from other cases involving cultural
icons and expressive freedom provides little help. The trademark
“cellophane” lost its trademark protection after nearly ten years of public
use as the default name for any cellulose wrapping material.107 Coca-Cola,
however, successfully protected its mark against the distributor of the
“Enjoy Cocaine” poster despite the fact that over 100,000 copies of the
work had been sold across the United States in less than two years.108 Elvis
Presley, a name unquestionably known throughout America as “The King”
and the subject of immeasurable commercial exploitation, both authorized
100
Greg Skoch, Student Author, Commercial Trademark Parody: A Creative Device Worth
Protecting, 9 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 357, 360 (1999).
101

Id.
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Cordero, supra n. 11, at 643.
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Skoch, supra n. 100, at 360.

104

Id.

105

Cordero, supra n. 11, at 653.

106

Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep, 874 F.2d 95, 95 (2d Cir. 1989).
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DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 82 (2d Cir. 1936).
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Coca-Cola, 346 F. Supp. at 1187.
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and unauthorized, successfully protected the use of his name against a onetime use by the owner of a restaurant named “The Velvet Elvis.”109
By advocating that the public has some limited right to comment on an
icon that it has helped to create, and then remaining mute on the boundaries
of this right, the Ninth Circuit has opened the floodgates for potential
parodists to have their way with Barbie.110 The district court recognized that
Barbie Girl was not the first song to poke fun at Barbie, but was rather only
one of among at least ten other such songs, most of which contain heavily
disparaging or vulgar comments about Barbie and the values that she
represents.111
The Mattel decision appears to give carte blanche permission to anyone
seeking to comment about Barbie. How many more parodies will it take
before Mattel will effectively lose any right, in a manner similar to that of
genericide, to police the use of its mark in the artistic world? So long as
future songs have at least some artistic relevance to Barbie and do not
explicitly mislead consumers as to Mattel’s affiliation with the work, it
appears that Mattel’s grip on the Barbie mark is set to slip just a bit more
with the release of every new song questioning the steadfast symbol of
American girlhood.
C. The Ninth Circuit’s Failure to Fully Consider Possible Future
Implications to the Barbie Trademark
MCA’s victory in the Ninth Circuit may have been a clear victory for
the champions of First Amendment rights, but it also may have marked the
beginning of the end for the Barbie mark. The act of recognizing a property
right in trademarks carries with it the cost of removing words from
common, everyday language.112 Thus, a trademark holder will be refused
protection if the trademark becomes generic and ceases to exclusively relate
to the trademark holder’s product.113 In taking into account Barbie’s status
as a cultural icon, ripe for parody, the Ninth Circuit may have unwittingly
forced the Barbie mark towards the beginnings of genericide.114

109

Elvis Presley, 141 F.3d at 200.
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Mattel, 296 F.3d at 900.
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Mattel, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1139.
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New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 306.
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Id. Although refusing protection to a trademark that has become generic through popular and
widespread use in everyday language may appear to defeat the purposes of trademark law, it provides a
necessary balance as the primary cost of recognizing a property right in trademarks is the removal of
those words from our common language. Id.
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Denying a generic trademark protection serves the purpose of reducing
the likelihood that trademark holders will deplete the stock of useful words
from our language by claiming exclusive rights to control their use.115 A
court will hold, as a matter of law, that a mark is generic when it comes to
describe a class of goods rather than identifying endorsement of an
individual product by the trademark holder.116 Examples of trademarks that
became generic are aspirin and kleenex; rarely today will anyone ask for
“acetyl salicylic acid” or “facial tissues” when they are in need of these
products.117
Similarly, the pop icons of today are constantly being reshaped as our
society attempts to invigorate our own images.118 Ours is a consumer-driven
era dominated by material symbols. Cultural icons are the signs of our time
and occupy an integral part of the common culture, becoming
“conventionalized, systematized and commercialized.”119 A cultural icon is
similar to a well-known and famous celebrity, and can be categorized as
being “ultra-distinctive.”120 The district court went so far as to claim that the
word “Barbie” is a cultural icon, stating that it “invokes not only images of
the doll itself but also cultural associations (e.g. the doll’s frivolous or
unreal nature) that might apply to real people as well.”121
The problem with cultural icons as trademarks is that the qualities of a
cultural icon (e.g. popular usage in everyday language and cultural
associations) appear to parallel those of a generic trademark.122 Unlike a
commercially trademarked product, such as aspirin, a cultural icon does not
seem to represent a single, definable object, feeling, or readily discernable
concept.123 Cultural icons represent a particular set of values to a broad
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Id. See DuPont, 85 F.2d at 82 (finding that Dupont’s trademark “cellophane” had become generic
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supplier).
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The term “cultural icon” has been employed in numerous judicial opinions to describe a myriad
of products and people. See e.g. Tiger Woods, because he is “one of the world’s most famous
professional golfers”; ETW Corp. v. Jireh Pub., Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 918 (6th Cir. 2003); The M&M’s
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Foods Corp. v. Homestead, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 500, 506 (M.D. Pa. 1998); A photograph of actress Demi
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to date. Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 948 F. Supp. 1214, 1221 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); and Winnie-
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group of people and may even represent different values to different
individuals.124 Barbie, for example, “has been seen as feminist and antifeminist; as seductive and wholesome; as intelligent and as a ‘dumb blond.’
Barbie has been hailed as a role model and condemned as the cause of
eating disorders.”125 Thus, outside the realm of children’s dolls, the term
“Barbie” in today’s popular culture really describes a class of attributes
referencing modern womanhood, just like the term “Band-Aid,” outside the
realm of bandages, represents a quick fix.126 By labeling Barbie as a cultural
icon, the court appears to have potentially weakened Mattel’s trademark as
against any future infringers who choose to utilize the Barbie mark outside
the realm of plastic dolls by providing clear precedent that the Barbie mark,
as a public icon, must stand the unwanted attention that comes with its
fame.127
IV. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit’s analysis of the issues surrounding Aqua’s right to
use the Barbie name in the title of the Barbie Girl song adequately resolved
the issue for the day, but provided a disappointing level of consideration of
the future implications of its decision. Specifically, the court blindly set
forth the policy that the public deserves some limited right to use the Barbie
name in any artistic critique of her without addressing the extent to which
this public right extends. Further, it provided no guidance as to what
underlying facts of a case will trigger application of the Second Circuit test.
Finally, the court failed to consider the possible damage that application of
this test may have on future alleged infringement actions as against the
Barbie mark. Barbie’s life in plastic may be fantastic for advocates of First
Amendment protection, but the message it sends to any ultra-successful
trademark holder is a disturbing reminder of the perils of being too famous.

the-Pooh, because in the “seventy-odd years since their creation” the characters “are so recognizable
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Presumably, however, the court’s decision would have little bearing on the strength of the Barbie
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